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Abstract
With adverse selection, diseconomies of scale associated with hier-
archies may induce the implementation of a second-best technology.
This occurs whenever rents to lower tiers of the hierarchy increase
faster than total surplus. This is more likely with longer hierarchies.
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1 Introduction
We analyze how a firm’s hierarchy length affects its technological choice in the
presence of hidden information. We find that diseconomies of scale associated
with multi-tier hierarchies may induce the firm owner to adopt a second-best
technology, thereby not maximizing overall surplus.
To model diseconomies of scale, we use the same approach as McAfee and
McMillan (1995) (hereafter MM). In a given hierarchy, production workers
privately observe a valuable information while managers, acting as contract-
ing intermediaries, face a limited liability constraint. In such a framework,
MM show that the optimal mechanism leaves rents to all the intermediary
echelons.
We extend their model by introducing a technological choice. We find
that implementing a better technology has two countervailing effects on the
firm owner’s profit: While average production costs decrease, expected in-
formational rents along the hierarchy increase. Consequently, the longer the
hierarchy chain, the less beneficial the implementation of a more effective
technology from the owner’s point of view.
2 The model
Following MM, we consider an organization with an exogenously given multi-
tier hierarchy. The hierarchy consists of a worker (hierarchy level 0) and k
principals (hierarchy levels 1, . . . , k). All parties are risk-neutral with an
outside option of zero. The top principal (level k) is the owner of the firm.
1
All other principals should be interpreted as middle managers, who play no
direct role in production other than passing on information. The worker
produces an output q ≥ 0 which accrues to the owner.
The owner’s valuation for output is v(q) ≥ 0 with v′ > 0 and v′′ ≤
0. The worker’s production costs are C0(q, t). His type t ≥ 0 is drawn
from a commonly known distribution F (t|µ) with density f(t|µ),1 where µ
characterizes the owner’s choice of technology. For simplicity, we assume
that this choice is costless.2
Production costs are not verifiable and only the worker observes t. Thus,
contracting with the worker is subject to an adverse selection problem. C0(q, t)
satisfies standard regularity requirements in output, i.e. C0q , C
0
qq > 0. More-
over, a higher type leads to lower costs and lower marginal costs, i.e. C0t , C
0
qt ≤
0.
To guarantee the existence of a separating equilibrium, the inverse hazard
rate
1− F (t|µ)
f(t|µ) =: h(t|µ) (1)
is assumed to be non-increasing in t. Regarding the effect of the technological
choice on the distribution of types, we assume hµ > 0. This assumption
implies Fµ(t|µ) < 0,3 i.e. an increase in µ improves F (t|µ) in the sense
of first-order stochastic dominance. Intuitively, by the choice of a superior
technology, low-cost types become more likely. What we have in mind is that
t is determined by an underlying match between the worker’s unobservable
1We assume that the functional forms are such that all integrals (expected profit etc.)
converge.
2We briefly discuss a costly technological choice in section 4.
3See, e.g., Krishna (2002), p. 260.
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ability and the firm’s technological choice.4 With this interpretation, a better
technology could be one which reduces the worker’s costs for every ability.
Timing is as follows. First, the owner chooses the production technology
µ. All parties observe µ. Then, the worker learns his type. Afterwards,
contracting takes place. The details will be specified below as they depend
on the length of the hierarchy. Finally, the worker produces and payments
are made.
3 The two-tier hierarchy
The two-tier hierarchy consists only of the worker and the owner. Given µ,
the owner’s optimal contract choice is a standard adverse-selection problem.
Following MM, her virtual costs of implementing output q for type t are
C1(q, t|µ) = C0(q, t)− h(t|µ)C0t (q, t), (2)
C1(q, t|µ) reflects that, when implementing a higher output for a worker of
type tˆ, the owner bears not only this worker’s additional production costs
but also a larger rent for all the workers of type t > tˆ.
Since hµ > 0 and C
0
t < 0, C
1(q, t|µ) is increasing in µ. Intuitively,
a better technology increases the proportion of more efficient types, which
raises expected rents. Consequently, the optimal output,
q∗(t|µ) = argmax
q
v(q)− C1(q, t|µ), (3)
4Formally, t could be a function of technology µ and ability s, t = m(s, µ), where s is
drawn from a commonly known distribution. Thus F (t|µ) = Prob[m(s, µ) ≤ t].
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is decreasing in µ. Thus, increasing µ leads to countervailing effects on
C1(q, t|µ). While the direct effect captured by C1µ is positive, the indirect
effect C1q q
∗
µ is negative. Looking at the owner’s expected profit,
Π(µ) = max
q(t)
∫ {
v(q)− C1(q, t|µ)} f(t|µ)dt, (4)
there is an additional effect due to the change in f(t|µ). The following result
shows that the overall effect on Π(µ) is unambiguous.
Proposition 1 In a two-tier hierarchy, the owner’s expected profit increases
in µ.
Proof By substituting (2) into (4) we obtain
Π(µ) =
∫ {
[v(q∗)− C0(q∗, t)]f(t|µ) + [1− F (t|µ)]C0t (q∗, t)
}
dt. (5)
Applying the envelope theorem yields
Π′(µ) =
∫ {
[v(q∗)− C0(q∗, t)]} fµ(t|µ)dt− ∫ Fµ(t|µ)C0t (q∗, t)dt. (6)
Partial integration of the first integral gives
Π′(µ) =
∫
q∗t h(t|µ)C0tq(q∗, t)Fµ(t|µ)dt ≥ 0. (7)
The sign follows because q∗t , h ≥ 0 and C0tq, Fµ ≤ 0. 2
Implementing a better technology raises the likelihood that the worker
has low production costs. Since such a worker generates a higher value added
4
(first integral in (6)) but also receives a larger rent (second integral in (6)),
we obtain two countervailing effects on Π(µ). The proposition shows that,
in a two-tier hierarchy, the value-added effect dominates the rent effect.
4 The multi-tier hierarchy - an example
We can anticipate how the foregoing intuition extends to a multi-tier hier-
archy. MM show that the rent extraction problem becomes more severe as
the hierarchy lengthens. This should aggravate the rent effect. In contrast,
the value-added effect should diminish since the scope for reducing output to
counteract the rent effect decreases. This suggests that there may be situa-
tions where the rent effect dominates. To verify this intuition, we transform
the example discussed by MM to obtain a constant hazard rate for all types.
This significantly simplifies the analysis.
Specifically, the owner’s problem now takes the form5
C0(q, t) = exp(−t)q
2
2
, (8)
where types are distributed according to
f(t|µ) =

1
µ
exp
(
− t
µ
)
if t ≥ 0
0 otherwise
, (9)
5In their example, MM assume C0(q, t) = (z + 1 − t)c(q) with uniformly distributed
types. In our example, substituting t˜ = z + 1 − e−t and interpreting t˜ ∈ [z, z + 1] as the
worker’s type yields the same cost function.
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with µ ∈ [µl, µh], 0 < µl < µh < 1.6 Valuation of output is
v(q) = q. (10)
In the contracting stage of the game, first the owner designs and imple-
ments a contract Rk−1(q) with the manager at level (k − 1), who afterwards
offers a contract Rk−2(q) to the manager at level (k−2) and so forth. Finally,
the first-level manager offers a contract R0(q) to the worker. Thus, if k ≥ 2,
the setup imposes per assumption that the owner cannot contract directly
with the worker.
Managers cannot transform the output but simply pass it up the chain.
At the time of contracting they do not know the worker’s type. Moreover,
managers face a limited liability constraint, which means that they must
be guaranteed a non-negative ex post rent for each possible t. The limited
liability requirement also ensures that the owner cannot sell the production
technology to a manager.
Applying MM’s recursive method7 yields the virtual costs along the hi-
erarchy chain. Given the constant hazard rate µ, virtual costs at level j
are
Cj(q, t|µ) = (1 + µ)je−t q
2
2
, j = 1, . . . , k. (11)
In particular, for j = k, the equation gives the owner’s virtual costs.8 As a
result, the owner designs the (k − 1)-level manager’s contract such that the
6The assumption µh < 1 ensures that the requirement that all integrals converge is
satisfied for our example (see footnote 1).
7Compare p. 408, eq. (7), in MM.
8It can be shown that the virtual cost functions satisfy eq. (11) in MM, i.e., managers’
limited liability constraints are binding.
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Figure 1: The owner’s expected profit pik(µ) for k = 1, 2, 3.
output
q∗(t|µ) = e
t
(1 + µ)k
(12)
is implemented. The payment schemes9 for the different hierarchy levels are:
Rj(q|µ) = 1
(1 + µ)k−j
q − 2(1 + µ)
j − 1
2(1 + µ)2k
, j = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1. (13)
They imply a strictly positive rent for every manager if t > 0. Substitution
for the (k − 1)-level generates the owner’s expected profit:
pik(µ) =
∫ ∞
0
[q∗ −Rk−1(q∗|µ)]f(t|µ)dt = 2(1 + µ)
k−1 − (1− µ)
2(1 + µ)2k(1− µ) (14)
Figure 1 depicts pik(µ) for k = 1, 2, 3, whereby a lower curve corresponds to
a higher k.
Proposition 2 For k ≥ 2, the owner adopts either the best or the worst
technology, i.e. µ ∈ {µl, µh}. Moreover, a necessary condition for adopting
9These schemes can be verified by checking eq. (A5)-(A7) in MM.
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µh is that µh exceeds a threshold µ¯(k), 0 < µ¯(k) < 1. The threshold µ¯(k) is
increasing in k.
The proof of proposition 2 is given in the appendix. It shows that pik(µ)
is non-monotonic in µ for all k ≥ 2. Specifically, it decreases if µ < µ¯(k),
and increases if µ > µ¯(k). Thus, the owner implements the best available
technology only if the expected reduction in production costs is sufficiently
high. Moreover, the larger k, the higher is the required cost reduction. This
verifies our intuition from the beginning of this section.
Obviously, the result that the owner may invest in a better technology
only if µh > µ¯(k) remains valid after the introduction of technology costs that
are increasing in µ. Furthermore, with linear or concave technology costs, due
to the fact that pik(µ) is convex for µ > µ¯(k), the owner will still implement
either µl or µh. Only if technology costs are convex, an intermediate µ may
be optimal.
5 Conclusion
We have shown how the optimal technological choice depends on the length
of a firm’s hierarchy. A better technology that lowers the worker’s average
production costs also increases expected rents along the hierarchy echelons.
Therefore, as the number of contracting intermediaries increases, the rent
effect may induce the owner to adopt a second-best technology.
Our result that a production-cost reducing technology may raise agency
costs should extend to other environments exhibiting diseconomies of scale,
e.g., due to hidden information and risk-averse intermediaries (Faure-Grimaud
8
and Martimort 2001) or moral hazard (Calvo and Wellisz 1978). Thus, al-
together we conclude that informational asymmetries combined with long
hierarchies will bias technological choice downwards.
6 Appendix
Proof of proposition 2. For all k ≥ 2, define µ¯(k) ∈ (0, 1) such that
∂pik(µ)
∂µ
∣∣∣∣
µ=µ¯(k)
= 0. (15)
We first show that µ¯(k) exists and is unique. It is easily verified that
∂pik
∂µ
= 0 ⇔ f(µ, k) := (1 + µ)k−1
[
2 + k
k
µ− 1
]
+ (1− µ)2 = 0, (16)
and, furthermore, that f(0, k) = 0, f(1, k) > 0, and ∂f
∂µ
∣∣∣
µ=0
< 0 for all k ≥ 2.
Thus, µ¯(k) exists.
Now define µ˜ as the smallest value from (0, 1) for which f(µ˜, k) = 0. Thus,
at µ = µ˜,
(1 + µ)k−1
[
1− 2 + k
k
µ
]
= (1− µ)2 (17)
holds. The rhs of (17) is decreasing and convex in µ. The first derivative of
the lhs of (17) w.r.t. µ is
(k − 1)(1 + µ)k−2
[
1− 2 + k
k
µ
]
− 2 + k
k
(1 + µ)k−1, (18)
which is negative if and only if µ > k
2−2k−2
k(2+k)
. Thus, since (17) holds for µ = 0
9
and the lhs may initially increase in µ, the lhs must decrease in µ at µ = µ˜.
Furthermore, its second derivative w.r.t. µ is
(k − 1)(k − 2)(1 + µ)k−3
[
1− 2 + k
k
µ
]
− 22 + k
k
(k − 1)(1 + µ)k−2. (19)
It is easily verified that negativity of (18) implies negativity of (19). Thus,
the lhs of (17) is decreasing and concave for all µ ≥ µ˜, while the rhs is
decreasing and convex for all µ. Therefore, there is no µ > µ˜ for which (17)
holds.
Hence, µ¯(k) is unique and denotes the global minimum of pik(µ) on (0, 1).
It follows that argmaxµ pi
k(µ) ∈ {µl, µh} and argmaxµ pik(µ) = µh only if
µh > µ¯(k). Furthermore, since the lhs of (17) increases in k, µ¯(k) also
increases in k. 2
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